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Professor of Law and Director, Law and Government Institute, Widener University Commonwealth Law School. This article is a part of an Association of American Law Schools symposium on executive power and the Obama administration. Thank you to Raquel Aldana and
Jennifer Chacón for organizing the symposium. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia provided insightful
comments on this article.
1. See, e.g., SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION (Ediberto Román ed.,
2015); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125
Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, Redux]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina
M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2010) [hereinafter Cox
& Rodríguez, President and Immigration]; Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the
Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2012); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The
Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2012); Lauren Gilbert,
Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Litigation Reform, 116 W.
VA. L. REV. 255 (2013); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of
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The role of the executive branch in enforcing immigration law is
the subject of renewed focus. In the academic realm, the spotlight
rests on the executive branch itself, as opposed to lumping together
both Congress and the executive as the political branches.1 This
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Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787 (2010); David S. Rubenstein,
Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (2013);
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010).
2. In this article, I refer broadly to the president as the head of the executive branch.
This article takes a broad look at executive procedural power in immigration law and does not
delve into the complexity of executive branch structure and the allocation of power within the
executive branch.
3. See, e.g., WADHIA, supra note 1, at 88–108; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U. N.H. L. REV. 1,
21–27 (2012); Lawrence Downes, On Immigration, It’s Texas 2, Obama 0, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING
NOTE (May 27, 2015, 3:18 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/onimmigration-its-texas-2-obama-0/.
4. See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, (1889); see also Jill E. Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27
WASH. U. J. LAW & POL’Y 71, 95–101 (discussing the plenary power doctrine).
5. Cox & Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 1, at 460–61.
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new focus on the executive branch alone creates space for scholars
to approach thorny separation of powers and federalism questions
surrounding the president’s2 exercise of discretion in enforcing immigration law. In the political realm, the contours of the executive’s
discretionary authority in immigration law have become a point of
contention between the president and Congress and have seeped
into the public discourse.3
This article adds to the renewed scholarly focus by examining
across executive branch agencies the role of procedure in the president’s exercise of authority over immigration law. This article extracts themes from some prominent procedural mechanisms that
accompany executive power over immigration law.
Traditionally, separation of powers doctrine in immigration law
has focused on the balance of power between the political branches
(Congress and the president) and the courts. The nineteenth century
plenary power doctrine helped to establish this dynamic. The plenary power doctrine established a plenary power to establish categories of entry and removability. It placed that unreviewable power with
the political branches, and therefore not with the judiciary.4 As Adam
Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have explained, however, the courts
have not detailed how power over immigration law is, or should be,
apportioned between the political branches.5
Turning attention away from the judiciary versus political
branches question, and instead narrowing the field of view to the two
political branches allows for examination of the roles of Congress
and the president in immigration law. Decoupling Congress and the
president in immigration law reveals that each plays a different role.
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6. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2002); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2009) (charging the Secretary
of Homeland Security with “the administration and enforcement” of immigration law).
7. Cox & Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 1, at 461.
8. Id. at 485.
9. Id. at 511.
10. Id.
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The president’s power over immigration law derives from a variety of sources. Some are more obvious than others. One fairly obvious source is that Congress has delegated discretion to the
executive in enforcing immigration law. For example, Congress has
charged the Department of Homeland Security with “establishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.”6 Less obvious is that the president may have some inherent authority over
immigration law based in the Constitution.7 This is authority that independently belongs to the president and does not depend on a
delegation from Congress.
Perhaps even less obvious is the power recognized by Professors Cox and Rodríguez. While Congress has formal statutory control over the categories and conditions of legal entry and
removability, Cox and Rodríguez argue that the authority delegated
to the president to enforce those statutory prescriptions gives the
president “tremendous authority” to control who is removed.8 The
president has this authority because the executive branch decides
who is placed in immigration removal proceedings, who is granted
relief from removal, and who is actually physically removed from
among the population of those with final removal orders. Because
the number of those who could be placed into removal proceedings
is much larger than the number of those who are actually removed,
executive branch choices determine the immigration futures of
many.9 Part of the president’s immigration authority lies in this gap.
The president’s authority over the gap (and, depending on funding,
to determine the size of the gap) has a major effect on the composition of the immigrant community in the United States.10
This article is less focused on the sources and boundaries of
the president’s power and more focused on the procedures used by
the executive to carry out its power over immigration law. In immigration law, the executive branch implements and, at times, creates
procedural decision-making frameworks. The executive branch
makes choices about what procedures it will use to exercise its
power over immigration law. For example, will a U.S. Citizen receive
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an explanation why her spouse will not receive permission to live in
the United States? Will applicants for legal status be aware of how
the executive branch will decide whether to grant them status? This
article explores the nature and variety of executive procedural power
over immigration law by looking at examples from executive agencies that contribute to executive action in immigration law. The
agencies are the Department of Homeland Security, the Department
of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of Labor.
This article identifies themes across the procedures that these
agencies use to carry out immigration decision-making. These
themes are that the structure of executive branch implementation of
immigration law is complex, that the use of guidance documents is a
popular procedural choice, and that minimal process is a prominent
feature. Also, this article raises some questions for future inquiry.
The president’s procedural choices to implement his power over
immigration law deserve sustained attention. Just as congressional
procedural choices can greatly affect any statutory substantive law,
executive branch procedural choices are an essential element of the
president’s power over immigration law.
II. THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION LAW

A. Executive Power Over Immigration Law Across Agencies
1. Department of Homeland Security: ICE, USCIS, and CBP

12/28/2015 14:43:02

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contains three
entities with power over the implementation of immigration law: (1)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); (2) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); and (3) Customs and
Border Protection (CBP). This section will discuss how ICE has
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To describe all of the procedures used by each agency with authority over immigration law would fill a treatise (or two). By looking
at examples of procedures from each agency, we can examine procedural power in immigration law across agencies, rather than focusing on one agency at a time. This sampling does not tell the
whole story about the power of process in immigration law, but it allows us to begin to see patterns across agencies and to raise questions for future inquiry. For each agency, this article focuses on a
prominent procedural approach that is the subject of recent or ongoing litigation, or that has otherwise raised controversy.
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made the procedural choice to use guidance documents to exercise
its prosecutorial discretion, how USCIS relies on guidance documents in its adjudication of applications for immigration benefits, and
how CBP uses procedures based in minimal process to adjudicate
applications for admission to the United States.
a. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
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11. What We Do, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.ice.gov/overview (last visited on Sept. 12, 2015).
12. As discussed below, USCIS and CBP exercise prosecutorial discretion as well.
13. See, e.g., Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1.
14. Id. at 246–65; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 101, 109–11 (2015).
15. See, e.g., Marshall Fitz, What the President Can Do if Congress Fails to Act, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 2014); Elise Foley, Dreamers at State of the Union Hope Obama
Continues to Push Forward on Immigration, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/21/obama-dreamers_n_6508692.html; Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 3, at 27–32; Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra
note 14, at 107–09.
16. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 246–65; see also Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing
Case(s) of Dream Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 475–92 (2012).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A

Immigration and Customs Enforcement is tasked with interior
enforcement. Among other things, ICE conducts workplace enforcement raids, charges foreign nationals with removability, and
maintains a vast network of immigration detention facilities.11 In its
operations, ICE exercises vast discretion over who is charged with
removability and placed into enforcement proceedings. ICE exercises this power through prosecutorial discretion.12
Study of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration
law makes up a significant part of renewed scholarly focus on executive power in immigration law.13 While the executive branch’s use
of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law is not new,14 the practice has recently received increased attention due to a stalemate
over immigration reform in Congress and the president’s announcement of two policies to provide temporary reprieve from removal to two groups. In the absence of legislative changes to the
immigration law statutes, advocates have pushed for the president
to use his sphere of power over immigration law to make all possible
changes to immigration law policy.15
Again, prosecutorial discretion in immigration law is not new.
For example, John Lennon received it in the 1970’s, and the executive has used this power in varying forms for many years.16 Three
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17. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field
Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, & All Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) (on file at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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recent prominent examples include the efforts of ICE in 2011 to better coordinate and centralize its prosecutorial discretion efforts, the
executive branch’s implementation of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), and the proposed implementation of Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA).
In 2011, ICE announced to its field office directors that they
should implement new prosecutorial discretion practices within their
respective districts.17 Building on agency memoranda dating back to
1976, the “Morton Memorandum” (named after former ICE Director
John Morton, the author of the memorandum) established guidance
on the agency’s prosecutorial discretion priorities and information
about who within ICE may exercise prosecutorial discretion. According to the memo, its purpose is to “ensure that the agency’s immigration enforcement resources are focused on the agency’s
enforcement priorities.”18 Citing limited resources, the Morton Memorandum explains that ICE must “regularly” exercise prosecutorial
discretion.19 The memo lays out a non-exhaustive list of factors that
authorized ICE agents “should” consider in deciding whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion, and thus not to pursue enforcement.20 According to the memo, no one factor is determinative.21
Examples of factors include: age; criminal history; circumstances of
arrival in the United States (did the person arrive as a child?); length
of presence in the United States; pursuit of education in the United
States; the existence of U.S. citizen children; and the person’s ties
to the community.22
The Morton Memorandum also mentioned “the agency’s civil
immigration enforcement priorities” as a factor for consideration in
determining whether to prosecute.23 These priorities previously were
discussed in another memorandum, also authored by then-Director
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Morton.24 In the memorandum, Morton explained that ICE has funds
to remove less than four percent of the undocumented foreign national population.25 The memorandum announced a hierarchal order
of attention. The highest priority was assigned to those foreign nationals who “pose a danger to national security or a risk to public
safety.”26 Priority two was assigned to recent illegal entrants. Priority
three was focused on fugitive foreign nationals or those who have
otherwise obstructed immigration controls.27
To further these policies, ICE announced a case-by-case review
of pending enforcement actions in November 2011.28 This memorandum directed ICE attorneys to look for cases where prosecutorial
discretion would be appropriate, based on the standards laid out in
previous ICE directives, including the two memoranda authored by
Director Morton described above. ICE attorneys were directed to
“decide whether [removal] proceedings . . . should continue or
whether prosecutorial discretion in the form of administrative closure
is appropriate.”29 As described below, these prosecution priorities
evolved again in November 2014.30
In June 2012, then Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano authored a memorandum announcing the DACA initiative.31
The memorandum explains that “in the exercise of our prosecutorial
discretion,” DHS (including ICE) should exercise its discretion and
not pursue enforcement against certain individuals who arrived in
the United States as children.32 Exercises of discretion are appropri-
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24. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All ICE
Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and
Removal
of
Aliens
(Mar.
2,
2011)
(on
file
at
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enf’t, to All Chief Counsel & Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, Case-by-Case Review of Incoming and Certain Pending Cases (Nov. 17, 2011) (on file at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certainpending-cases-memorandum.pdf).
29. Id.
30. See infra notes 43–49.
31. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Homeland Sec., to David
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012)
(on file at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individualswho-came-to-us-as-children.pdf).
32. Id.
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33. Id.
34. Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited Aug. 29, 2015);
see infra note 56.
35. About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
36. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions (last updated June 15, 2015).
37. Id.
38. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2015).
39. Fixing the System: President Obama is Taking Action on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE
(Nov. 20, 2014) (video available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/immigrationaction#).
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ate for those who: (1) arrived before the age of 16; (2) have continuously resided in the United States for five years before the date of
the memorandum; (3) are present in the United States on the date of
the memorandum; (4) are in school, have graduated from high
school, have a GED, or who have been honorably discharged from
the U.S. military; (5) have no felony convictions, no convictions for a
significant misdemeanor offense, or no multiple misdemeanor offenses, or who otherwise are not a public safety threat; and (6) are
less than the age of thirty-one.33 In 2014, President Obama announced a “second generation” version of DACA that would eliminate the age cap, among other changes. DACA 2.0 has not been
implemented due to ongoing litigation.34
The original DACA memorandum set the stage for the implementation of a new application procedure within USCIS, also a part
of DHS. While ICE is focused on charging, detention, and removal,
USCIS administers the granting of immigration benefits, such as the
grant of lawful immigration status.35 Through a series of answers to
“Frequently Asked Questions,” (FAQ) USCIS laid out how it would
accept and consider applications for prosecutorial discretion under
DACA, including a special application form with instructions.36 As the
answers to the FAQ reveal, a DACA grant does not result in a legal
immigration status, but results in a revocable promise from the government not to enforce for a specific period of time.37 Also, those
foreign nationals granted deferred action under DACA are eligible to
apply for permission to work in the United States pursuant to a preexisting regulation governing work authorization.38
Two years after the implementation of DACA, President Obama
announced a similar initiative called DAPA.39 DAPA also does not
grant legal status, but it offers deferred action to the parents of U.S.
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citizen children and to the parents of children who are lawful permanent residents (“green card” holders) of the United States.40 Those
parents who are granted deferred action under DAPA are eligible to
apply for work authorization based on a pre-existing regulation.41
Through an agency memorandum, the executive branch announced
the DAPA eligibility criteria: (1) continuous residence in the United
States since January 1, 2010; (2) an existing U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident son or daughter as of November 20, 2014; (3)
physical presence in the United States as of November 20, 2014
and at the time of application; and (4) that the individual is not an enforcement priority.42 USCIS would adjudicate applications for deferred action under DAPA.
Contemporaneously, DHS released a new priorities and prosecutorial discretion memorandum.43 This memorandum rescinds the
2011 memoranda described above and establishes three priority
categories. The highest priority, “Priority 1,” is reserved for individuals who the government categorizes as threats to national security,
border security, or public safety.44 Enforcement resources should be
concentrated on this category, which includes terrorism suspects,
those apprehended at the border, and foreign nationals convicted of
an “aggravated felony” (as that term is defined in the Immigration
and Nationality Act).45 “Priority 2” belongs to misdemeanants and
new immigration violators.46 This category includes those convicted
of three or more misdemeanors, those convicted of a “significant
misdemeanor,” and foreign nationals who are apprehended after entering the United States without permission and who have not been

12/28/2015 14:43:02

40. Id.
41. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2015).
42. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon
Rodriguez et al., Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect
to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 4, 5 (Nov.
20, 2014) (on file at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf).
43. See generally Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et al., Acting Dir., Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file
at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pd
f) [hereinafter Enforcement Memo].
44. Id. at 3.
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2015).
46. Enforcement Memo, supra note 43, at 3.
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47.
48.
49.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, U.S.
&
CUSTOMS
ENF’T,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.,
IMMIGRATION
https://www.ice.gov/immigrationAction/faqs (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
50. See generally IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR, COMPARISON CHART: DACA, CALIFORNIA
DREAM ACT, AB 540, AND DREAM ACT (2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrcdaca_comparison_chart-2012-10_10.pdf.
51. See generally Jens Manuel Krogstad & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/07/24/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/.
52. See WADHIA, supra note 1, at 13; Jason Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (2015); Cox & Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 1, at
511–19; Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 252–53, 256, 270–72.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 41 Side B

present in the United States since January 1, 2014.47 “Priority 3” belongs to other immigration violators (including those whose legal status has expired) and represents the lowest priority for
enforcement.48 ICE maintains a list of frequently asked questions on
its website that helps to explain its prosecutorial discretion policies.49
While prosecutorial discretion is a mainstay feature of immigration enforcement, recent prosecutorial discretion efforts also are
linked to the failure to achieve statutory reform of immigration law.
For almost ten years, Congress has considered, but failed to
achieve, statutory immigration law reform. DACA is not the statutory
reform sought through the DREAM Act.50 The DREAM Act would
place undocumented foreign nationals who arrived as children on
the path to legal status in the United States, and eventual possible
U.S. citizenship. DACA, on the other hand, only grants a temporally
limited, revocable promise not to enforce and is not a legal status itself. The ICE memoranda setting enforcement priorities are the
product of a scenario where a failure to update the congressionally
chosen legal immigration categories and quotas, in addition to other
complex forces, led to an undocumented population in the United
States estimated at 11 million.51 Because the immigration statutes
are so harsh when it comes to the granting of relief from removal
and are so broad in terms of who is eligible for removal, the statutes
have made the executive branch the pressure point.52 A decision not
to enforce is the only hope for millions.
These prosecutorial discretion policies are not without their critics. Critics challenge as unconstitutional President Obama’s efforts
to exercise executive branch immigration power through these pros-

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 42 Side A

12/28/2015 14:43:02

3FAMILYFINAL(DONOTDELETE)

2016]

12/24/20155:28PM

EXECUTIVEPOWERINIMMIGRATIONLAW

69

ecutorial discretion initiatives.53 Critics argue that congressional
stalemate is not a constitutional justification for the executive branch
to usurp the lawmaking power, and that the DACA and DAPA initiatives are unconstitutional breaches of the president’s duty to execute
the laws faithfully.54 An additional argument is that DAPA violates
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).55 A district court judge enjoined the implementation of DAPA and DACA 2.0 because the
judge concluded that the executive’s use of an agency guidance
document, rather than notice and comment rulemaking, violated the
APA.56 That decision is under consideration by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.57 Others, including myself, have argued
that these policies are well within the power of the executive and
that DAPA does not violate the APA.58
My purpose here is not to reiterate the debate over legality, but
rather to emphasize that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion requires procedural choices. These choices include how, if at all, to
formulate and announce prosecutorial discretion policies, and what
kinds of procedural mechanisms, if any, will accompany the process
to decide whether prosecutorial discretion should be granted to an
individual. In the prosecutorial discretion examples discussed above,
DHS chose to announce its policies through guidance documents,
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53. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015); Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2013); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo,
Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM
Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013).
54. Id.
55. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 647.
56. Id. at 677.
57. Ariane de Vogue, Legal Fight over Obama’s Immigration Orders May Outlast His
Presidency, CNN POL. (Sept. 29, 2015) http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/29/politics/immigrationobama-lawsuit-delays/.
58. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency
Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts, 114th Cong. 1, 2 (2015) (written testimony of Jill E.
Family),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-1915%20Family%20Testimony.pdf; see also Open Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Clinical Professor of Law, Pa. State Univ., et al. (Mar. 13, 2015) (on file at
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/LAWPROFLTRHANENFINAL.pdf); Open Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, et al. (Nov. 25, 2014) (on file at
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/executive-actionlaw-prof-letter.pdf); see generally Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Litigation Over Administrative Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 58 (2015); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion:
The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167
(2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration-enforcement-discretionthe-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-kris-kobachs-latest-crusade; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response: In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
59 (2013).
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rather than notice and comment rulemaking. Even though it chose
guidance documents over public notice and comment, DHS chose to
be transparent in its memoranda about the things it will think about
when deciding whether to grant prosecutorial discretion.
b. Interlude: Guidance Documents
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59. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2015).
61. Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L.
REV. 565, 570–71 (2012).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2015).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2015).
64. Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 578–79.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 42 Side B

As the following discussion reveals, DHS is not the only immigration agency that relies on guidance documents. These rules are
not formulated through the notice and comment procedures of the
APA.59 When an agency uses such rules correctly under the APA,
the APA does not require the agency to seek comment from the
public or to respond to any comments.60 These rules therefore shortcircuit what many think of as the “normal” rulemaking function under
the APA—an agency posts a proposed rule, accepts public comment, considers those comments, and then publishes a final rule
that responds to the comments.
One type of guidance document is a policy memorandum,
which is a memorandum from a high-ranking agency official to lower
ranking agency officials on some topic within the agency’s enforcement power.61 The APA recognizes “general statements of policy” as
an exception to its notice and comment rulemaking requirements.62
The APA defines a “rule” to include both legislative (legally binding)
and non-legislative (not legally binding) rules.63 Therefore, a policy
statement still contains a “rule” under the APA.
Guidance documents are helpful in that they allow for a form of
communication from the agency to regulated parties and to the public in addition to notice and comment rulemaking.64 Through policy
memoranda, regulated parties and the public can get a sense of the
agency’s ideas on a particular issue. Policy statements let regulated
parties know how the agency plans to exercise its enforcement
power. Given the enormity of the statutory gaps that agencies often
must fill, the limited resources of agencies, and the cost and time
commitments required to engage in notice and comment rulemak-
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65. Id.
66. Id. at 572.
67. Id. at 599–604.
68. Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61; see generally Jill E. Family, Easing the
Guidance Document Dilemma Agency by Agency: Immigration Law and Not Really Binding
Rules, 47 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 (2013).
69. See Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 566; Family, Easing the Guidance
Document Dilemma, supra note 68, at 35.
70. Id.
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ing, guidance documents are an important tool both for agencies
and regulated parties.65
Guidance documents are not legally binding, however. That
means that in an enforcement action where a policy statement is at
issue, either the agency or a regulated party is free to argue that a
different rule should apply other than that expressed in a policy
statement.66 Also, because a guidance document is not legally binding, it is relatively easy for an agency to change positions by issuing
a new policy memorandum. Instead of enduring other rounds of notice and comment, an agency simply issues a new policy memorandum to update its plans or outlook towards a particular issue.67
Elsewhere I have detailed the problems caused by reliance on
guidance documents.68 The use of guidance documents raises concern generally in administrative law that agencies are seeking to
avoid the procedural obligations of notice and comment rulemaking.
The procedural protections of notice and comment rulemaking are
neutered if agencies regularly circumvent them through the use of
guidance documents. For an agency short on resources, following
the policy memorandum procedural path to make a rule is less cumbersome and time-consuming. It also may be less visible if the
agency wants to keep a low profile on a particular issue.
Another concern is that agencies use policy memoranda to bind
practically, even if not legally.69 Even though rules announced
through policy memoranda are not legally binding, a regulated party
probably will feel obligated to comply with the policy announced in
the memorandum. Following the memo presents the path of least
resistance because the content of the memo represents the position
the agency most likely will take in any enforcement action. Therefore, policy memoranda have a practically binding effect, even if they
are not legally binding, and that practical effect arises without the
procedural protections of notice and comment rulemaking.70
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Transparency is also a problem when it comes to guidance
documents. While issuing a guidance document is more transparent
than saying nothing, regulated parties complain that they are unfamiliar with the process used to formulate guidance documents.71
This is true in both immigration law and administrative law generally.72 The formulation process is often a mystery, with a memorandum simply posted to an agency website or circulated through
informed legal circles.73
c. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
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71. Family, Easing the Guidance Document Dilemma, supra note 68, at 35–36.
72. See generally id. at 35–36, 44–48.
73. USCIS does post some draft memoranda for comment, but that practice raises its
own questions. Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 608–15.
74. About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
75. Attachs. to Appellant’s Emergency Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal, Attach. 6, Declaration of Donald Neufeld, at 2, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16,
2015).
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ICE is not the only immigration agency to rely on guidance documents. Recent efforts at shaping enforcement priorities are high
profile, but the executive exercises other types of discretion in immigration law that are just as consequential. While the executive does
exercise control over removal, the executive branch also exercises
control over who may gain legal status in the United States. USCIS
exercises this power. The focus here shifts from those who are removable to those who are seeking legal status in the United States.
These are individuals who are seeking approval, who are arguing
that he or she fits within the categories and quotas of legal immigrants established by Congress. For example, a pharmaceutical
company may wish to employ a foreign national scientist in the United States, a U.S. citizen may wish to sponsor his or her spouse for
lawful permanent residence, a U.S. technology company may wish
to temporarily employ a foreign national, a U.S. citizen may wish to
employ a foreign national as a home health aide, or a foreign national may wish to apply for naturalization. While Congress sets the
general categories and quotas, the executive branch fills in the details and actually adjudicates benefit applications.74
USCIS maintains a network of adjudication offices and centers
that process about seven million applications per year.75 Overall,
USCIS employs about 18,000 individuals at various types of facili-
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ties. There are four service centers and eighty-seven field offices. 76
USCIS’s budget is about $3.2 billion.77 About ninety-five percent of
the budget comes from user fees.78 For most cases, the foreign national selects the appropriate USCIS form, completes it, and mails it
to a USCIS Service Center with the appropriate fee and supporting
documentation.79 USCIS then adjudicates the application, either
granting it or issuing a Request for Evidence (RFE).80 If the response to the RFE is not adequate, USCIS will deny the application.
The field offices provide direct, in-person services to foreign nationals.81 In-person interviews, for example, take place at field offices.
Sometimes an application requires adjudication at both a service
center and a field office. There is an appellate administrative body
within USCIS called the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO).82
During an adjudication, a USCIS adjudicating officer looks to
many sources of law. There is the Immigration and Nationality Act,
regulations, and an array of agency guidance documents. Many important questions critical to the adjudication of immigration law benefits are in agency memoranda.83 The USCIS Policy Manual contains
twelve volumes.84 For example, Volume 12, which covers citizenship
and naturalization, contains twelve parts and sixty-three chapters.85
A U.S. citizen who wishes to obtain lawful permanent resident
status for his or her spouse might not know that many issues affecting such an application are addressed in policy memoranda. For example, if a U.S. citizen marries a foreign national who entered the
United States without permission and has been unlawfully present,

76.
77.
78.
79.
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Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See generally STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 302(4)(b)–(c), (e) (2015).
80. Id. at § 3.02(4)(e)(ii) (2015).
81. See generally Field Offices, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/find-uscis-office/field-offices (last visited Oct.
29, 2015).
82. See generally Directorates and Program Offices, The Administrative Appeals Office
(AAO), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/administrative-appeals-officeaao/administrative-appeals-office-aao (last updated Oct. 7, 2015).
83. See generally Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 593–99.
84. Policy Manual, Table of Contents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S.
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.
(current
as
of
July
21,
2015),
DEP’T
http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-TableOfContents.html
[hereinafter
USCIS Policy Manual].
85. Id.
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the amount of unlawful presence will be critical in determining
whether it is safe for the spouse to leave the United States to apply
for permanent residence.86 If the spouse has too much unlawful
presence, the spouse is subject to a three or ten-year bar from reentering the United States upon exit.87 This bar is effective despite
marriage to a U.S. citizen. The rules addressing the accumulation of
unlawful presence are largely contained in a thick policy memorandum.88
USCIS has worked to improve the transparency and accessibility of its policy memoranda in recent years. First, it implemented a
Draft Memorandum for Comment procedure that allows the public to
comment on policy memoranda before the documents become official.89 Second, USCIS has created its Policy Manual that brings together its memoranda into one source that is accessible from the
agency’s website.90
USCIS makes many procedural choices when deciding how to
adjudicate applications for immigration benefits. It has established a
vast adjudication system filled with technical procedural choices, including which mechanisms USCIS will use to establish these procedures and to fill in statutory gaps. One procedural favorite is clear:
the guidance document. Just as DHS has used guidance documents
to announce its prosecutorial discretion policies, through USCIS,
DHS relies on guidance documents to run the benefits adjudication
system.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

86. The spouse is not permitted to “adjust” his or her status to lawful permanent resident
while in the United States due to the illegal entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). That leaves the option of
“consular processing” outside of the United States. If the spouse leaves the United States,
however, the spouse may trigger a ban on re-entering the United States. If the spouse has
more than 180 days of unlawful presence, the spouse is subject to a three-year ban. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). If the spouse has one year or more of unlawful presence, the ban is 10
years. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). See also Family, Easing the Guidance Document Dilemma, supra note 68, at 2–3.
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
88. Interoffice Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations Directorate, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Field Leadership, Consolidation of
Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act (May 6, 2009) (on file at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/200
9/revision_redesign_AFM.PDF).
89. Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 610–15.
90. USCIS Policy Manual, supra note 84.
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d. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
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91. About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.cbp.gov/about (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
92. Border Security, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
93. Immigration Inspection Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/overview (last visited Oct. 29,
2015).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
97. Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 600–04 (2009).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
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The final component of DHS discussed here is U.S. Customs
and Border Protection.91 CBP duties include patrol and surveillance
of the U.S. borders and the inspection of individuals seeking entry to
the United States.92 CBP provides an example of reliance on minimal process in immigration law.
CBP officers staff the U.S. ports of entry and examine the entry
documents of foreign nationals who wish to enter.93 At the border,
CBP officers check for required documents and determine admissibility. Congress has created grounds of inadmissibility.94 These are
categories that describe behavior or circumstances that result in refused entry to the United States even if the foreign national qualifies
for a lawful immigration category. For example, the spouse of a U.S.
citizen qualifies in a lawful immigration category due to the spousal
relationship, but if the foreign national spouse has a criminal history,
that spouse may be inadmissible despite the marriage to a U.S. citizen.95
If CBP determines that a foreign national is inadmissible, CBP
may offer to allow the foreign national to withdraw his or her application for admission or CBP may place the foreign national in removal
proceedings.96 These removal hearings would determine whether
the individual should indeed be denied lawful entry and be returned
to his or her country. The adjudicators in these hearings are immigration judges, who are employees of another agency, the Department of Justice.97 These hearings are more complex than might be
expected. Questions of admissibility can be quite thorny.98
Congress has delegated to the executive branch the power to
procedurally expedite the removal of foreign nationals who it deter-
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99. 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
100. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 253.3(B)(7).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
103. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). There is no judicial review of the immigration judge’s
decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A).
105. Family, A Broader View, supra note 97, at 624–27.
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mines to be inadmissible in two different categories.99 These expedited removal procedures allow CBP to avoid the relative formality of
a removal hearing and to instead make a quick decision to remove,
subject only to intra-agency supervisory review.100 If a CBP officer
believes an individual is inadmissible under the misrepresentation or
lack of proper documents inadmissibility grounds, CBP may remove
that individual without any hearing.101 There is an exception for
those who express to a CBP officer that he or she has a fear of persecution. Those individuals are sent to a credible fear interview before an asylum officer.102 If the individual succeeds at the credible
fear interview, he or she receives an asylum hearing, but may be detained until the hearing.103 If the individual fails, he or she is subject
to expedited removal unless an immigration judge reverses the determination of a lack of credible fear.104
Expedited removal is an example of minimal process. While expedited removal is a congressional procedural choice, it still adds to
our understanding of the procedures used across executive agencies to implement immigration law. Expedited removal provides minimal process because it pulls back from the standard level of
process (a full removal hearing) and instead provides a procedural
substitute that is less robust. Additionally, while expedited removal is
a statutory creature, CBP has discretion in how it implements this
statutory directive. CBP’s implementation of expedited removal has
been criticized as avoiding even the minimal procedural protections
mandated by Congress for expedited removal.105
Within DHS, we see ICE, USCIS, and CBP, which are three entities with diverse missions. While there are differences, the work of
the three units ultimately comes together to exercise significant authority over the admission and removal of foreign nationals. In terms
of procedure, reliance on guidance documents is prominent, as is
the absence of robust procedural protections in the context of expedited removal.
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2. Department of Labor
The executive also exercises power over immigration law
through the actions of the Department of Labor (DOL). DOL is
charged with protecting U.S. workers and plays key roles in certain
employment-based benefit applications and in employment-based
workplace enforcement.106 For example, DOL approves prevailing
wages for certain types of temporary and permanent foreign workers.107 DOL also audits U.S. employers to verify the implementation
of wage obligations.108
DOL uses a process called Permanent Labor Certification Program (PERM) to certify which employers may hire a foreign national
on a permanent basis.109 The PERM process is often the first step
for an employer who wishes to sponsor a foreign national for lawful
permanent residence.110 The PERM process may result in a certification that there are no qualified and willing U.S. workers for the
proposed job, and that the employer is promising to pay the prevailing wage.111 This DOL certification then is sent to USCIS with a petition to classify the potential employee as a lawful permanent
resident.112 PERM is an audit-based system.113 In the application for
a labor certification, employers must complete several attestations,
including that the employer conducted the required pre-filing recruitment efforts.114
In operating PERM, DOL has promulgated regulations,115 but
also relies on guidance documents, including a series of 191
“FAQs.”116 In these questions and answers, DOL addresses a wide

12/28/2015 14:43:02

106. Wage and Hour Division Administered Immigration Programs, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/immigration/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2015).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Permanent Labor Certification, Foreign Labor Certification, EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/perm.cfm (last updated Aug. 22,
2014).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFFICE,
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title20/20cfr656_main_02.tpl (current as
of Sept. 30, 2015).
116. OLFC Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, Foreign Labor Certification, EMP’T
& TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
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http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/faqsanswers.cfm#Perm_Program (last updated Aug. 3,
2015).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Prevailing Wages (PERM, H-2B, H-1B, H-1B1 and E-3), Foreign Labor Certification,
EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pwscreens.cfm (last updated July 11, 2014).
120. Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance: Nonagricultural Immigration Programs, EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (revised Nov. 2009),
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_11_2009.pdf.
121. 20 C.F.R. § 656.26(a); 20 C.F.R. § 655.11(a); 20 C.F.R. § 656.41(a).
122. Payless Shoe Source, 2013-PWD-00004 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor 2013) (Order Affirming
Denial of Certification).
123. Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, supra note 120, at 13.
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variety of substantive issues that are crucial to the outcome of a labor certification application. Some of these FAQs are a summary of
information from a regulation,117 but some provide the only source of
authority on an issue. For example, an FAQ provides the source of
instruction of how to report the licenses of a foreign worker to
DOL.118 DOL does not clarify which FAQs provide the sole source of
authority for an issue and which clarify a regulatory principle.
Also, DOL uses a policy memorandum to flesh out details of the
prevailing wage determination, a key component of the labor certification process. DOL explains on its website that it uses a guidance
document to issue prevailing wage determinations, and links to it.119
The document is thirty-six pages long. The document references a
prevailing wage regulation but states that the document provides
“policy and procedural guidance” to DOL employees making prevailing wage determinations.120 According to DOL’s appellate administrative body that hears appeals of prevailing wage determinations,121
this guidance document “outlines a step-by-step, standardized approach for determining the appropriate [prevailing wage].”122
As an example of the types of issues addressed in this guidance document, it directs agency adjudicators what to do when an
employer’s job description contains supervisory duties. The memorandum states: “In this new guidance, an employer’s job requirement
for supervisory duties will not automatically warrant a determination
at the highest wage level because the wages for supervisory occupations already account for the supervision of employees.”123
Like DHS, DOL makes a variety of procedural choices when it
chooses how to administer its corner of immigration law. Those procedural choices include reliance on guidance documents.
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3. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ), another executive branch
agency, also exercises immigration law power. DOJ houses the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR),124 which is the home
of immigration judges and members of the appellate Board of Immigration Appeals. Immigration judges and Board members are employees of DOJ and work for the Attorney General.125 These
adjudicators are not Administrative Law Judges and lack the decisional independence enjoyed by Administrative Law Judges.126 In a
removal proceeding, an immigration judge decides whether the Department of Homeland Security’s charge of removability will stick, or
whether a foreign national is entitled to relief from removal.127 The
availability of relief is limited, as Congress has set detailed, nondiscretionary criteria,128 but nevertheless, for those who do not receive a grant of prosecutorial discretion, it is up to an executive
branch immigration judge to determine whether relief is available
under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the appellate
agency adjudicatory body and renders a final order of removal.129
Problems with immigration adjudication within DOJ are well
documented. Challenges include record-breaking case backlogs in
the immigration courts,130 too few immigration judges,131 a lack of
lawyers for foreign nationals,132 a lack of decisional independence
for immigration adjudicators,133 inconsistent decision-making,134 re-
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124. EOIR Mission, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
125. Family, A Broader View, supra note 97, at 600–08.
126. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (“The immigration judges are attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints as administrative judges”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (“The Board members shall
be attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General’s delegates in
the cases that come before them.”)
127. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.37.
128. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1229b.
129. The immigration judge’s order becomes the final removal order if there is no appeal
to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
130. As of September 2015, there were 456,644 cases waiting to be adjudicated in the
immigration courts. Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of September 2015,
TRACImmigration,
TRAC
REPORTS,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php (last visited Oct.
29, 2015).
131. Family, A Broader View, supra note 97, at 600–04.
132. Id.
133. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 369 (2006).
134. JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009).
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strictions on judicial review of removal decisions,135 efforts to further
restrict federal court oversight,136 and applicable substantive law that
is harsh and leaves little room for adjudicator discretion.137
Even though DOJ’s adjudication of immigration removal cases
is deeply flawed, perhaps even more disturbing are efforts to divert
cases from even receiving that flawed process.138 Through waivers,
expedited removal, and the criminalization of immigration law, many
removal cases are decided outside of DOJ’s adjudicatory process.
For example, forty-four percent of removals in Fiscal Year 2013
were expedited removals.139 If a foreign national is subject to expedited removal, waives the right to a hearing, or concedes removability through a criminal process, then the foreign national will never
enter DOJ’s civil immigration adjudication system.
Removal adjudication within DOJ, and efforts to divert foreign
nationals from DOJ’s adjudication processes, are examples of minimal process. Many of the problems with removal adjudication within
DOJ can be traced back to Congress. For example, DOJ has not received sufficient increases in funding to cope with the increased enforcement efforts that have resulted in the need for more removal
hearings.140 And it is Congress, of course, who has limited judicial
review of agency removal decisions. Regardless of the source,
however, this troubled adjudication system is an example of a complex procedural system that provides minimal process, if any process at all.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

135. 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
136. Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The Certificate
of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499 (2008); Jill E. Family, Removing the Distraction of Delay, 64
CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 99 (2014).
137. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 UNIV. KAN. L. REV. 541, 551–63 (2011).
138. Family, A Broader View, supra note 97; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due
Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication,
91 N.C. L. REV. 475 (2013); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and
the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 1–2 (2014).
139. John F. Simanski, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS:
2013
(2014),
IMMIGRATION
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.
140. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence, supra note 137, at 564–66; Backlog of
Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of September 2015, TRACImmigration, TRAC
REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php (last
visited Oct. 29, 2015).
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141. One exception to this requirement is the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals of certain countries to travel to the United States as a visitor without first obtaining a visa in
the individual’s passport. 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2014).
142. See, e.g., Applying for a Visa, EMBASSY OF THE U.S. LONDON – UK,
http://london.usembassy.gov/niv/apply.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
143. Id.
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Both CBP and DOS make admissibility determinations. If a foreign national needs a visa, the admissibility determination will be made twice.
145. Id.
146. RUTH E. WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41093, VISA SECURITY POLICY: ROLES OF
DEPARTMENTS
OF
STATE
AND
HOMELAND
SECURITY
(2010),
THE
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/138767.pdf.
147. MAILMAN &YALE-LOEHR, supra note 79, at § 3.11 (2015).
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The Department of State (DOS) operates the U.S. consulates
that adjudicate applications for visas to travel to the United States.
Obtaining a visa is an essential yet independent step for many foreign nationals who are abroad and who wish to enter the United
States legally.141 Even if USCIS approves a foreign national for a
certain category (spouse of a U.S. citizen or temporary worker for a
U.S. company, for example), that foreign national must obtain a visa
from DOS in that category to be able to travel to the United States.
Obtaining a visa is a complex, multistep process.142 The process requires the completion of forms, paying fees, and often attending an in-person interview.143 The decision whether to issue a
visa depends on a foreign national’s admissibility to the United
States.144 As explained above, Congress, through the Immigration
and Nationality Act, has established categories of individuals who
are not admissible, no matter whether they fall into a legal immigration category.145
Despite the fact that DOS operates the consulates, the Department of Homeland Security also plays a large role in the visa issuance process. DHS has the authority to refuse to issue a visa, as
does DOS.146 Therefore, while visa applicants may interact only with
DOS employees at the consulate, the Department of Homeland Security plays a role behind the scenes.
If a visa application is denied, the main recourse is to apply
again. Because of the consular non-reviewability doctrine, judicial
review is minimal. Under the purest form of this doctrine, executive
consular decisions are untouchable; the courts play no role in reviewing them.147 The Supreme Court has shown willingness, however, to at least demand a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason
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148. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
149. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
150. Id. at 2131. Din’s husband did not challenge the visa denial because the plenary
power doctrine eliminates the constitutional rights of foreign nationals applying for admission
to the United States. Family, Threats, supra note 4.
151. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2132.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2132, 2140–42, 2144–45.
154. Id. at 2145–46.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2138.
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for a visa denial.148 This minimal protection is at least greater protection than concluding that visa application decisions are nonjusticiable.
The Supreme Court heard a procedural challenge to DOS’ adjudication of a visa application during its October 2014 term in Kerry
v. Din.149 Din, a U.S. citizen, challenged the denial of her husband’s
application for an immigrant visa to join her in the United States.150
DOS denied her husband’s application for a visa because DOS determined her husband to be inadmissible to the United States.151
DOS cited to a statutory section in communicating the visa denial.
The statutory section, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), addresses terrorist
activities.152 It includes a range of activities, from engaging in terrorist activities to providing material support to a terrorist organization.
Essentially, by citing to this broad statutory section, DOS told Din
and her husband that he is inadmissible because he engaged in at
least one of the many types of activities described in the statute, but
did not tell him exactly which one.
Din argued that the DOS denial violated her procedural due
process rights because DOS did not adequately explain the reason
why it determined her husband to be inadmissible and therefore ineligible for a visa.153 Citation to the statutory section alone, she argued, was not constitutionally adequate because the statutory
section encompasses a wide range of behaviors.154 Din believed
that she was entitled to a more specific and detailed explanation of
why DOS determined her husband to be inadmissible under that
particular statute.155
A fractured Supreme Court produced a majority only as to the
result—Din lost. Three justices (Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts) believed that Din’s interest in having her husband receive a visa does
not qualify as “life, liberty or property” under the Due Process
Clause.156 According to these justices, Din had no eligible protected
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interest. Two justices (Kennedy and Alito) determined that the Court
need not reach the issue of whether Din held an interest protected
by the Due Process Clause, because even if she did, the process
the government provided was adequate under the “facially legitimate
and bona fide” standard.157 Four justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) dissented and explained that Din’s interest in
her husband’s visa application is protected by the Due Process
Clause and that the procedure provided (the citation to the broad
statutory section) was inadequate.158
While it is still an open question whether a U.S. citizen’s interest
in a spouse’s visa application is a protected liberty interest, the result of this case is that it was adequate for the government only to
provide cursory information about why it denied Din’s husband’s visa
application. A simple citation to a broad statutory section that encompasses a variety of behavior was acceptable.
Din is another illustration of the force of minimal process in immigration law. For Din and her husband, enjoyment of their marriage
inside of the United States is not a possibility. To be together, the
two will need to live somewhere other than the United States. The
possibility of living together in the United States was extinguished
without a detailed explanation. According to the Court, she was not
due anything more.
B. Procedural Themes Across Agencies and Questions for Further Inquiry

157.
158.

Id. at 2139.
Id. at 2141–42.
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The procedures discussed in Part A lead to a few key themes.
First, executive procedural power over immigration law is not a
monolith. Second, guidance documents play a prominent role in the
exercise of executive procedural power over immigration law. Third,
minimal process also is a conspicuous feature.
Even this introductory discussion of the procedural choices and
mechanisms that accompany the executive procedural power over
immigration law reveals that referring to the “administration of immigration law” is overly broad. The administration of immigration law
involves six different main components, each with a unique function
and mission. At times some of these six units must work together; at
times they are autonomous. At times, some units repeat tasks per-
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159. Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 616.
160. Id. at 615; WADHIA, supra note 1, chapter 7; Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 296 (recommending notice and comment rulemaking for deferred action); Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 3, at 21–27.
161. Family, Easing the Guidance Document Dilemma, supra note 68, at 8.
162. Id. at 6–7.
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formed by another unit. Despite that each of these six units ultimately report to one president, each has made its own procedural choices, and some have had procedural choices imposed by Congress.
Improving executive procedural power over immigration law will require many tiny brush strokes, and not one large stroke.
As explained above, the implementation of immigration law relies on guidance documents. While this reliance is problematic, the
use of guidance documents is common across administrative law. In
fact, it would be more helpful conceptually to think of notice and
comment rulemaking under the APA as the exception. This is actually an area where immigration law’s troubles converge with the mainstream.159 Agency use and reliance on guidance documents is a
large question looming over all of administrative law.
The fact that the problem pervades administrative law is not an
excuse to ignore the issue within the context of immigration law,
however. USCIS has attempted some improvements, but the use of
guidance documents in immigration law will present an important
line of inquiry for years to come. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and I
have each called for USCIS to decrease its reliance on guidance
documents, even if the APA would permit USCIS to use a guidance
document.160 Also, I have called on USCIS to develop Good Guidance Practices to steer its use of sub-regulatory rules.161
The use of guidance documents is tied closely to the issue of
transparency in the administration of immigration law. Guidance
documents in immigration law present a procedural mismatch.
Guidance documents are a procedural mismatch because guidance
documents are one of the most convoluted procedural mechanisms
in administrative law, and immigration law arguably provides the
least sophisticated group of regulated parties: immigrants who may
lack resources and who may not even speak English. With guidance
documents, the applicable rules are not as visible because they are
in a memorandum. Unrepresented foreign nationals may not even
know to look for a memorandum, and if they did, it is not clear if
those individuals would understand the difference between a memobased rule and a regulation or a statute.162 Additionally, even law-
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163. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing how the Obama administration promotes transparency through its implementation of DACA and its proposed implementation at DAPA).
164. Wadhia, Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 294–97; Wadhia, Sharing
Secrets, supra note 3, 48–60; see also Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation, supra note
1, at 1789–90.
165. WADHIA, supra note 1, at 17–18, 55–57; Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 3, at
48–51.
166. Id.
167. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last
updated Aug. 3, 2015).
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yers have complained that the memorandum formulation process is
a mystery to them, and that memo-based rules may unexpectedly
change.
Guidance documents and transparency concerns also converge
in the context of prosecutorial discretion.163 While the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion gives the president the power to shape the
population of foreign nationals in the United States, few procedural
protections accompany the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Professor Wadhia has raised important concerns about the lack of
transparency surrounding prosecutorial discretion.164
For an individual outside the DACA initiative (and perhaps
eventually DAPA), there is no real application procedure short of
asking an ICE officer to consider an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.165 An unrepresented individual may not even know that prosecutorial discretion exists, let alone know how to ask for it. The nonDACA prosecutorial discretion memoranda envision a system where
ICE officers themselves will initiate consideration.166 Therefore, a
foreign national might not even know whether prosecutorial discretion was considered at all, let alone be aware of reasons why ICE
may have decided to prosecute anyway. Also, even if a foreign national or his or her attorney is aware of ICE’s memoranda-based enforcement priorities, the recourse for being placed in removal
proceedings even if a person does not fall within the enforcement
priorities is a mystery.
DACA has a more transparent procedural framework (and perhaps DAPA would be more transparent). USCIS maintains a portion
of its website dedicated to the DACA application procedure.167 There
is a designated application form accompanied by detailed application instructions as well as detailed explanation of the criteria for eli-
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Id.
Id.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS REQUESTING AND APPROVED FOR DEFERRED ACTION FOR
CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS
(DACA)
(2014),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Deferred%20Action%20for%20Ch
ildhood%20Arrivals/USCIS-DACA-Characteristics-Data-2014-7-10.pdf.
171. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
SERVS.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.,
IMMIGRATION
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last
updated Aug. 3, 2015).
172. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions (last updated June 15, 2015).
173. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 1, at 60.
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gibility for consideration (including videos, infographics, and tables).168 There is also some explanation that the “DA” in “DACA”
stands for “Deferred Action,” which is not a legal immigration status.169 Also, USCIS has published detailed reports containing data
describing those who have applied for and those who have received
deferred action under DACA.170 Addressing review of a decision to
deny deferred action to a DACA applicant, the website states: “If
USCIS decides not to grant DACA in your case, you cannot appeal
the decision or file a motion to reopen or reconsider. USCIS will not
review its discretionary determinations.”171
While DACA is more organized and transparent in the sense
that there is an application form and therefore an established adjudicatory process, and in the sense that USCIS issues reports on
DACA, DACA is based on a memo. In fact, many of the details are
contained in a “Frequently Asked Questions” document, and not
even in an authored memorandum.172 While USCIS has been more
open about how it will adjudicate DACA applications and what
standards it will apply in deciding whether to grant deferred action
under DACA, the process and the standards rest on easily-shifted
ground. USCIS changes and updates its DACA Frequently Asked
Questions simply by posting an updated version on its website. A
new president may choose to eliminate the program altogether and
may do so with little procedural fanfare.
Also, the efforts to be more transparent about deferred action
have opened up DHS to criticism that because it has listed criteria
and has established an application process, it has violated the APA
by not using notice and comment rulemaking.173 Because DHS really meant to establish a legally binding rule, the argument goes, DHS

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 51 Side A

12/28/2015 14:43:02

3FAMILYFINAL(DONOTDELETE)

2016]

12/24/20155:28PM

EXECUTIVEPOWERINIMMIGRATIONLAW

87

committed a procedural error by choosing to use guidance documents over the mechanism of notice and comment rulemaking.174
Some believe that because DHS has laid out criteria, the central
administration has extinguished the discretion of individual enforcement officers, forcing officers to grant deferred action if the criteria
are met.175 As explained above, a policy memorandum is not supposed to be legally binding.
These efforts at transparency, therefore, have potentially placed
the agency at a litigation disadvantage when determining whether
the agency properly invoked the guidance document exception to
notice and comment rulemaking. If this argument succeeds, then an
agency is better off to say nothing if it wants its procedural choice to
be accepted. In implementing DACA, DHS could have said nothing,
released no memoranda, and never posted answers to frequently
asked questions. It could have let front line officers randomly decide
when to grant deferred action with no guidance from central administration. Foreign nationals would be left to guess who might qualify,
and would be unsure about the procedure for seeking deferred action. The resolution of this conundrum is especially important to immigration law, where the regulated parties are individual foreign
nationals who are often unrepresented.176 Transparency is tremendously important.
There is an issue here that cuts to the heart of an unresolved
issue in administrative law. When courts say that a policy memorandum cannot be binding, who must not be bound?177 Is central admin-
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174. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015).
175. Id. at 668–70.
176. See Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at app. A (showing representation
rates before USCIS); FY 2014 Statistics Yearbook, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, at F1(Mar. 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf
(showing a 55% representation rate in immigration court for fiscal year 2014).
177. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377, 384–85 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (invalidating a guidance document because it bound applicants); McLouth Steel Prods.
Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (invalidating a guidance document
where the court determined the agency to be “close-minded and dismissive”); see also Robert
A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992) (arguing
that policy memoranda should not be used to bind the public even if there is only a practical
binding effect); The President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 1, at 67–68, n.296 (describing critics of DAPA as promoting the idea “that enforcement discretion be located exclusively in the hands of line-level enforcement personnel”); Michael Kagan, Binding the
Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind President Obama’s Immigration Actions,
50 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Proce-

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 51 Side A



37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B

12/28/2015 14:43:02

3FAMILYFINAL(DONOTDELETE)

88

12/24/20155:28PM

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 91:1



12/28/2015 14:43:02

dural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 348–49 (2011) (exploring the parameters of the binding nature of guidance documents).
178. See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 1, at 74; Cuéllar, supra note, 1 at 53–54;
Kagan, supra note 177, at Part III; Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and
Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUS. (2014).
179. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme
Court confirmed the President’s authority to recognize foreign sovereigns and struck down a
congressional statute that interfered with that power. This case is instructive in that it repre-
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istration able to bind lower level agency adjudicators through policy
memoranda? Or, is it acceptable for central administration to bind its
own employees, as long as it leaves open two possibilities: (1) that
central administration may change its mind and (2) that a regulated
party may argue that a different rule, other than the one in the policy
memorandum, should apply. For example, the DAPA memorandum
instructs lower level DHS employees to consider certain criteria, and
then to decide whether to exercise discretion to grant deferred action. Does the direction provided to the vast network of adjudicators
doom the procedural choice? If the answer to that question is yes,
that would present major organizational challenges, especially in an
area of law where lower level adjudicators have not been shy to resist directives from central administration.178 If the answer is yes,
then what does that mean for prosecutorial discretion in immigration
law in general? May central administration provide any guidance as
to when prosecutorial discretion should be exercised?
The final theme, minimal process, is another one to watch. This
theme of minimal process is not as developed across all agencies
with authority over immigration law. As our view expands, we can
see how minimal process creeps into various aspects of executive
immigration power, including the visa adjudication process. This
wider view gives us a fuller picture of the executive branch’s posture
towards procedural protections in immigration law. Reliance on minimal procedures signals that the executive is not investing resources
in more robust protections.
This tendency toward minimal process becomes even more
significant as we begin to imagine the potential future of executive
power over immigration law. For executive power that relies on a
delegation from Congress, the sources of procedural protection are
any that Congress may provide and the Due Process Clause. But
what if the Supreme Court clarifies what it has left cloudy: What if
the Supreme Court clarifies that the President has some measure of
inherent power over immigration law?179 What procedural protec-
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tions would apply? Would only the Due Process Clause apply?
Would there be some mechanism to influence the executive to voluntarily impose greater procedural protections?
III. CONCLUSION

sents an effort to separate out power between the President and Congress and recognizes a
type of power that belongs solely to the President.
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The renewed scholarly focus on the executive branch’s power
over immigration law must include study of the procedures the executive uses to implement immigration law. Looking across executive branch agencies charged with enforcing immigration law, the
overall picture is not one of robust procedural protections. This wider
view is especially significant as scholars explore the potential
boundaries of the president’s inherent authority over immigration
law.
While the APA may permit agencies to make the procedural
choice to use guidance documents, immigration agencies should
think carefully about when and how they use them. Guidance documents are a necessary and important feature of administrative law,
but the drawbacks of this procedural mechanism have special importance in immigration law. Guidance documents can be a useful
tool for explaining information in plain English, but guidance documents rest on shifting ground and foreign nationals may not even
know they exist. Even if they are known, their legal significance may
be confusing to foreign nationals, and they do not provide legally enforceable rights.
While courts may hold that immigration procedures that provide
minimal process are constitutional, such as the expedited removal
program and vague explanations for visa denials, the executive
branch should provide more process. Political and historical forces
have pushed us toward a time of strong executive discretionary
power over immigration law. With that power is a need for greater
procedural protections.
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